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In this paper I will claim that methodology of law and economics should be changed  
from adopting economic analysis of law, namely implementing price theory and  
welfare economics (economization of law) to the scientific efforts aiming at an inter-
disciplinary project embracing law and economics as well as jurisprudence.  The  
basis for such a project is purported by the Coase theorem, but may also be found in  
writings of Hayek and „old institutionalists”, such as Veblen, Hale and Commons.  
The purpose of this paper is thus twofold: firstly, to present briefly the most power-
ful and popular version of law and economics being at the same time influential leg-
al  theory-  the  Chicago  school.  Secondly,  to  analyze  the  existing  alternative  ap-
proaches to economics of law, related to Austrian school (Hayek), „old institution-
al” economics (Commons) and transaction cost economics (Coase).
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* *
*
Economics of law is thought to be a relatively new discipline. Many authors 
draw attention to its origins rooted deeply in a well known article of Ronald 
* The article has been prepared within the framework of the research project: N110011 
31/1634 financed by the Polish Ministry of Science.
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Coase and his famous theorem.1 It  is  Coase who has demonstrated how 
much economy depends on sound legal system, especially on assignment of 
private rights and liabilities. Others regard Garry Beckers’ efforts to provide 
a solid and objective basis for social theory and legal reforms as the origins 
of contemporary law and economics.2
In this paper I will claim that methodology of law and economics should 
be changed from adopting economic analysis of law, namely implementing 
price theory and welfare economics (economisation of law) to the other atti-
tude consisting in scientific efforts aiming at an interdisciplinary project em-
bracing law and economics as well  as jurisprudence.3 The basis  for such 
project is purported by Coase theorem, but may also be found in the writ-
ings of Hayek and  „old institutionalist”,  such as Veblen, Hale and Com-
mons. These efforts are visible as far as new institutional economics and 
transaction cost economics are concerned.
The aim of this paper is thus twofold: firstly, to present briefly the most 
powerful and popular approach to economics of law being at the same time 
influential legal theory as presented by the Chicago school, predominantly 
by Judge Richard Posner, and to point out limits of this approach from juris-
prudential, economic and methodological point of view. The second aim is 
to analyse the existing alternative approaches to economics of law, related 
to Austrian school (Hayek), „old institutional” economics (Commons)4 and 
transaction cost economics (Coase).
Economics of law is most often associated with the so called Chicago 
school of law and economics.5 According to R. Posner, the popularity of this 
1 COASE, R.H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3, pp. 1-44.
2 POSNER, R.A. (2001). Frontiers of Legal Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, pp. 52-61.
3 About  the  „jurisprudential  niche”  and  the  role  of  economics  of  law  as  jurisprudential 
theory, cf. N. Mercuro, and S.G. Medema (1997), Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-
Modernism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 3-21.
4 I am perfectly aware that some basic assumptions of the „old institutionalism” are at the 
moment unacceptable for the majority of present mainstream economists. The more 
interesting thing is, however, the influence of Commons methodology upon Coase, the fact 
that should not be ignored – cf. S.G. Medema (1994), Ronald H. Coase, London: Macmillan, 
pp. 24-26.
5 MERCURO,  N.,  MEDEMA  S.G.  (1997).  Economics  and  the  Law.  From  Posner  to  Post-
Modernism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 2.
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approach results from two factors: the crisis of traditional legal doctrine and 
the success of the economics of non-market behaviour.6
The starting point for economic analysis of law is the assumption that 
decisions may be based either on intuition and vague moral beliefs or on 
scientific data. If economics is just a theory of choice it should prima facie be 
an excellent data provider for judges and legislators.
Thus the rationale of the economic analysis of law is rather simple: to im-
plement economics to legal decision-making process.  The Chicago school 
implemented welfare economics with its theory of self-interest, price and ef-
ficiency. The basic assumption of the theory regards human nature: it as-
sumes that people are rational and they maximise their satisfactions in a 
nonmarket as well as in market behaviour. Their preferences may be repres-
ented by utility function. The  „economic man” may be perfectly rational 
while braking legal norms if it maximises his utility.
The second pivotal assumption of the economic analysis of law states 
that individuals respond to price incentives in nonmarket behaviour in the 
same  way as  if  they  were  on  market.  It  means  that  legal  sanctions  are 
treated as prices.7
The third assumption is that legal decision-making process should imit-
ate market. It means that law should be analysed from the perspective of 
economic efficiency. The Chicago approach derives from Kaldor-Hicks cri-
terion of wealth maximisation.8
The other theory stemming from this methodology is a hypothesis about 
the internal efficiency of common law, efficiency achieved due to the pro-
cess of selection of norms by virtue of litigation.9 The Chicago approach in-
cludes both: positive and normative theory of law. The first claims that law, 
at least common law, is in fact based on efficiency principle and that judges, 
even if using other terms such as justice, still treat efficiency enhancement 
6 POSNER,  R.A. (2001).  Frontiers  of  Legal  Theory. Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University Press, pp. 31-46.
7 COOTER R., ULEN T. (1997). Law and Economics. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, p. 3.
8 POSNER R.A. (1992). Economic Analysis of Law. 4th edition, New York: Little Brown and Co, 
p. 10; COOTER R., ULEN T. (1997). Law and Economics. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, p. 
41.
9 PRIEST G. (1977). The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules. Journal of 
Legal Studies 6, p. 65.
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as the main purpose of law.10 The normative theory states that if some parts 
of legal system are not promoting efficiency, such rules should be changed 
to reflect the efficiency-enhancing attitude of the whole legal system.
At  the  moment  economic  analysis  of  law  might  be  regarded  as  one 
among  equal  trends  of  the  contemporary  jurisprudence.11 As  such  the 
movement  found  strong  opposition  among  many  authors.12 One  of  the 
strongest critics is Ronald Dworkin who opposes the recognition of wealth 
as a basic value within society and the dependence of other values and al-
location of rights upon wealth maximization.13 Dworkin points out that the 
initial allocation of rights cannot be instrumental, i.e.  based on efficiency 
principle because the argument is deteriorated by its circularity.14 The cru-
cial issue, however, seems to be the scepticism among economists or eco-
nomically  oriented  lawyers.  Ronald  Coase  in  his  polemics  with  Richard 
Posner refuted not  only his  economic  imperialism,  but rather  the  whole 
methodology attached to welfare economics.15 For Coase economics of law 
was to overcome narrow and artificial approach of the welfare economics, 
especially concentrated on the price theory and equilibrium model. He dir-
ectly opposed the expansion of principles of traditional economy to non-
market sectors.16
Another problem with economic analysis of law is firmly related to the 
notion of efficiency. For the Chicago school the idea of efficiency is central 
and indisputable.  According to Kaldor-Hicks  criterion the notion of  effi-
ciency is perceived as a static factor whereas other concepts of efficiency are 
10 It is not strange, if according to Posner „A second meaning of justice,(...) is simply effici-
ency”; R.A. Posner (1975), „The Economic Approach to Law”, Texas Law Review 53, p. 777.
11 A. T. Kronman describes it as: „the most powerful current in American teaching today. (It) 
now completely dominates some fields and is a significant presence in others”; 
KRONMAN, A.T. (1993). The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession. Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 226.
12 FRIED, CH. (1977. Difficulties in the Economic Analysis of Rights [in:] G. Dworkin et al. 
(eds.), Markets and Morals, New York, p. 180; COLEMAN J. (1980). Efficiency, Utility, and  
Wealth Maximization. Hofstra Law Review 8, p. 531; E.J.; WEINRIB (1995). The Idea of Private  
Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 46-50.
13 DWORKIN, R. (1998). Law’s Empire. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2nd ed., pp. 276-280.
14 DWORKIN, R. (1980). Is Wealth a Value?. Journal of Legal Studies 9, pp. 191-95.
15 Coase-Posner debate; POSNER, R.A. (1993). Ronald Coase and Methodology. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, pp. 200-209; COASE R.H. (1993). Coase on Posner on Coase. Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149, pp. 96-98.
16 COASE, R.H. (1988). The Firm, the Market and the Law. Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, pp. 3-5. His approach is influenced by A. Smith and J. R. Commons; 
MEDEMA, S.G. (1994). Ronald H. Coase. London: Macmillan, pp. 24-26, 168.
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not attached to allocation of resources between economic agents. H. Leiben-
stein’s concept of “X” efficiency refers to the internal productivity of eco-
nomic institution.17 Deakin and Hughes purported with the notion of effi-
ciency  in  context  of  legal  regulation,  the  so  called  technical  efficiency.18 
Zerbe as well as Sen called for broadening the notion of efficiency so that 
also sentimental value could have been encapsulated.19
Summarising, it may be stated that economic analysis of law substitutes 
moral theory with its central notion of justice by economic theory with its 
central notion of efficiency.20 Nevertheless the deconstruction of the notion 
of efficiency results with refutation of the static model of wealth maximisa-
tion based on the price theory.
The economic imperialism is, however, not only a theoretical project. It 
rather reflects a wider social, political and historical phenomenon: the „eco-
nomisation” of social life. In the last twenty years moral or ideological de-
bate in politics as well as a wider part of social discourse have been domin-
ated by economic debates.21 Economy plays a more and more important role 
within the society, due to the long historical process of the collapse of tradi-
tional moral and political thinking, technical progress, civilisation changes, 
globalisation process and the bankruptcy of the centrally planed econom-
ies.22 Social sciences, legal theory and moral philosophy admit the omnipo-
tence of economic relations within the contemporary society. In democratic 
and liberal pluralistic societies the only linkage among individuals seems to 
be economic exchange.23 The contemporary society is no longer based on 
moral  consensus but on free  market  and liberal  democracy being values 
17 LEIBENSTEIN H. (1981). Microeconomics and X-Efficiency Theory. [in:] BELL, D., KRISTOL, I. 
(eds.). The Crisis in Economic Theory. New York: Basic Books Publishers, pp. 97-110.
18 DEAKIN, S., HUGHES, A. (1999). Economic Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company  
Law. Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review 3, pp. 173-175.
19 ZERBE, R.O. (2001). Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
pp. 14-31, 152-158; SEN, A. (1995). Rationality and Social Choice. American Economic Review 
85, p. 15.
20 COLEMAN, J. (1980). Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization. Hofstra Law Review 8, pp. 
531-535.
21 For example, after 1989 economic issues were regarded as of highest importance within the 
debate on transition in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe.
22 FUKUYAMA, F. (1989). The End of History. The National Interest 6, p. 8.
23 One of the best exponents of the thesis is HAYEK, F.A. (1976). Law, Legislation and Liberty. A 
New Statement of the Principles of Justice and Political Economy, vol. 2: The Mirage of Social  
Justice. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 114.
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themselves.24 This  observation  is  shared  by  pragmatists,  functionalists 
(Rorty) and communitarians (MacIntyre).25
The modern economics of nonmarket behaviour is based on philosophic-
al  assumptions regarding human nature,  ethics  and political  philosophy. 
These assumptions and other axioms of economic theory, especially its ab-
stract character and repugnance of realism, are too rigid and narrow when 
applied to such complex social reality as law.26 The formalism and axiomat-
isation of economics was purported principally by Alfred Marshall, who be-
lieved that economics had to limit its scope to processes that had a price 
measurement. According to this approach,  the economic laws are simple 
generalisations  about  human  behaviour  measured  in  terms  of  money.27 
Thus economics has been definitively founded on models based on axioms 
abstracting from the real world.28 Such models embrace the set of ideas such 
as the notion of equilibrium as stated by Marshall or the concept of the sys-
tem of markets and general equilibrium endorsed by Walras and then defin-
itely formalised by Arrow and Debreu.  This evolution in one word lead 
from economics regarded as political economy studying historical society as 
it was understood by A. Smith, to formalised abstract study of interrelated 
variables  applicable  to  any system of  production  or  exchange,  and after 
Becker’s discovery of the economics of non-market behaviour, even to any 
social relations.29
The majority of economic analysis remains a normative project  rather 
than a positive description or explanation.30 According to Friedman’s meth-
odology,  the  purpose  of  economics  is  to  predict,  not  to  explain.  Posner 
claims it advantageous but such a defense seems doubtful.31 In order to ex-
plain legal phenomena a richer ontology and a broader scientific perspect-
24 MORTON, P. (1998). An Institutional Theory of Law. Keeping Law in its Place. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 16-18.
25 GOLECKI, M.J. (2000). Cnota czy wspolnota polityczna (Virtue or Political Community. Some 
Remarks on Alisdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory). Kwartalnik 
Konserwatywny (The Conservative Quarterly) 6, pp. 130-132.
26 BELL, D. (1981). Models and Reality in Economic Discourse. [in:] BELL, D. and KRISTOL, I. 
(eds.). The Crisis in Economic Theory. New York: Basic Books Publishers, pp. 76-79.
27 Ibid, p. 56.
28 Ibid, pp. 57-58.
29 BECKER, G.S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
30 T. Lawson points out Carl Menger as the author of this approach – LAWSON, T. (1997). 
Economics and Reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 113-126.
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ive are needed. Therefore, a new methodological approach is necessary in 
order to introduce a truly interdisciplinary research. The possibility of such 
methodological endeavour may be historically illustrated.
One of the earliest interdisciplinary approaches to law and economics 
may be found in the theory of J.R. Commons. Commons searched for legal 
foundations of economy. His theory of property gave rise to more general 
observations  regarding  the  evolution  of  law and economy.32 He  defined 
market as a process and a flow of transactions. Market was possible only if 
there were at least two transactions - one actual and the next best alternat-
ive.33 The price system operated in a real  environment influenced by in-
equalities between parties.34 This inequality was connected to the distribu-
tion of economic power which created a basis of managerial transactions. 
The transactions between legal and economic superior and legal and eco-
nomic inferior took place not on market but within economic institutions. 
As far as those managerial transactions were concerned the legal framework 
reflected economic inequality.35 Thus the economic power induced also a 
legal power. The notion of legal power and of different categories of legal 
rights implemented by Commons were closely connected to the Hohfeld’s 
theory of legal power and legal rights. This lead to the development of the 
concept of managerial transaction and economic institutions.
The version of  institutional insight  into economics  endorsed by Com-
mons was to some extent shared by Ronald Coase. Coase adopted the dis-
tinction between bargaining  transaction  and managerial  transaction.  The 
former referred to market exchange, the latter to economic institutions “su-
perseding” price mechanism, such as firm and government. The institution-
al analysis included in The Nature of the Firm passed unnoticed within main-
stream economics.36 It is rather The Problem of Social Cost that raised extens-
ive references and comments both by economists and lawyers. In this article 
31 POSNER, R.A. (1992). Economic Analysis of Law. New York: Little Brown and Co, 4th ed., p. 
17; FRIEDMAN, M. (1953). The Methodology of Positive Economics [in:] FRIEDMAN, M. (ed.). 
Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 14; S.G. MEDEMA 
(1994). Ronald H. Coase. London: Macmillan, pp.135-136.
32 COMMONS, J.R. (1974). Legal Foundations of Capitalism. New York 1924 (1st edition), 
reprinted New Jersey: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, pp. 11-46.
33 Ibid, p. 66.
34 Ibid, pp. 90-97.
35 COMMONS, J.R.(1934). Institutional Economics. New York: Macmillan, p. 634.
36 S.G. Medema (1994), Ronald H. Coase, London: Macmillan, p. 21.
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Coase noted that the characteristics of the world of economic analysis, the 
world of Zero Transaction Costs (ZTC world) made the initial allocations of 
rights irrelevant. This means that in ZTC world, where information is per-
fect, there would be no influence of law upon allocation of resources.37
But we do not live in such world, says Coase.38 In a real world of positive 
transaction costs allocation of rights effects outcome of economic activity. 
This means that law may increase or decrease transactional costs and alloc-
ative efficiency. This also means that what makes market more perfect or 
less  perfect  is  not  economics  but  rather  legal  framework.  It  forms  the 
ground for the so called normative Coase theorem which states that judges 
taking up any legal decision should be aware of its economic implications. 
They should also take them into account as to minimise transactional costs 
„insofar as this is possible without creating too much uncertainty about the 
legal position itself”.39
The Chicago school plainly states that law should be based on efficiency 
calculations. In fact normative Coase theorem does not offer a basis for such 
unanimous and straightforward interpretation. Coase in his discussion with 
Pigou suggested limitation of regulation by means of tax law and tax policy. 
It does not mean however, that he uncritically pushed for liberalisation and 
limitation of transactional costs by virtue of freedom of contract,  liability 
rules and protection of property. This solution would rather comply with 
basic assumptions of welfare economics, especially with policy recommend-
ations formulated by K. Arrow referring to the General Equilibrium Mod-
el.40
There  is  another  way of  reducing transactional  costs:  by  substituting 
market by firm perceived as an institution with its own hierarchy of power 
of decision-making. The firm however needs its own internal regulations 
37 The proposition was then called by Stigler as „Coase Theorem”; R.H. Coase (1988), The  
Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 14.
38 It is perhaps the most important conclusion drawn from his analysis. Coase thus put 
himself on the opposite side of the contemporary mainstream economics, denying 
accurateness of formal analysis in economics including modern price theory as 
implemented in economic analysis of law.
39 R.H. Coase (1988), The Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, p. 119.
40 ARROW, K.J. (1969). The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of  
Market versus Nonmarket Allocation. [in:] The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures:  
The PPB System. Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong. 1st sess., Washington: U.S. 
Government Prinitng Office, pp. 56-60.
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(e.g.  company law,  insolvency law, etc.).  It  is  somehow paradoxical  that 
there is no escape from law. One can try to maintain ZTC like world but the 
price would be sometimes extensive regulation (e.g. securities law, stock-ex-
change law, etc.). But firm has yet another meaning, not linked with eco-
nomic activity- it is an institution, where transactional costs are reduced by 
virtue of power and limitation of individual preferences submitted to the 
purposes of the organisation.
The question arises why law is so necessary for reducing transactional 
costs? It seems to be jurisprudential theory the endeavour to answer this 
question.41 Nevertheless,  the most  jurisprudential  question is  related dir-
ectly to the normative Coase theorem. Is Coase suggesting that law should 
enhance efficiency? Should it promote free exchange and property rights? 
The answer to these questions depends on how seriously do we treat the 
ZTC world. For Coase this is the world of welfare economics. But is it a 
model-world which should be established in reality? In other words, should 
we intend to transform the real world of positive TC into ZTC world of eco-
nomic models? Coase does not directly answer those questions, but to some 
extent he suggests the solution.42 The institutional framework arises if the 
TC are too high. In case of high TC firm will substitute free exchange. Is it 
better to have market near to ZTC or to have institutional environment? 
Coase in one place suggested that ZTC world as for example in case of stock 
exchange requires massive regulation. Such complex regulation will tend to 
generate  additional  TC,  if  it  is  too  complicated.  But  the  observation  en-
dorsed  by  Coase  vicariously  opposes  this  „pro-market”  solution.  Coase 
seems to be more sceptical when he suggests, that there is no escape from 
law in the artificial ZTC world. The world reminding ZTC world may tech-
nically  be  built  by  virtue  of  massive  regulations,  and in fact  transforms 
stock exchange in sort of firm with its internal power and organisational 
hierarchy.43
41 This issue addresses also a question about the ontological nature of law as underpinning of 
the economic activity and specifically as a foundation of the market.
42 About the indeterminacy of Coase normative theorem see DEAKIN, S. (1999). Law Versus  
Economics? Reflections on the Normative Foundations of Economic Activity. [in:] RICHARDSON, 
M., HADFIELD, G. (eds.). The Second Wave of Law and Economics. Sydney, pp. 34-39, who 
suggests three possible interpretations. According to Deakin none of those is correct, and 
empirical research is necessary to solve the problem; ibid, p. 39.
43 COASE, R.H. (1988). The Firm, the Market and the Law. Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, p. 10.
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In conclusion I would suggest that normative Coase theorem is a myth 
based on oversimplification. Coase simply observed a kind of economic reg-
ularity concerning the relationship between market as decentralised institu-
tion regulated by the price theory and economic institutions regulated by 
internal relations of power. Neither of them is better - there are comple-
mentary elements of economic system. As far as law is concerned, there is 
no trace of proposition that either public or private, statutory or judicial law 
is better. Coase analyses only the basic influence of law upon both market 
and firm or government. His legal analysis is perhaps not extensive but it is 
profound. Law seems to rule economic system shifting some sectors of eco-
nomic activity between market, firm and government by virtue of the level 
of TC. At the same time there is no escape from law. Similarly to Commons, 
Coase emphasised that economic goods are bunches of rights assigned to 
legal individuals in accordance with legal rules. Law thus creates the kind 
of framework of economic system.44 One of the most important features of 
this framework remains the certainty about legal position which is the limit 
of the instrumental purpose oriented legal decision-making process.
The close analysis of Coase theory provides the view substantially differ-
ent from the slogan about pursuing efficiency in law so characteristic for 
economic analysis of law. Economics of law seems to be a more profound 
theory of the relationships between two systems of values, two frameworks 
of society: law regarded as a normative system providing order and stabil-
ity for  any actions of  individuals,  and market  economy:  economic  order 
maintained by legal rules and consisting of activities of individuals.  This 
landscape of the spontaneous social order delimited by law demarcation 
lines is very akin to Hayek’s theory of nomos, taxis and cosmos.
The  starting  point  for  Hayek  is  the  epistemological  assumption  that 
knowledge and information is dispersed. Individual agents have limited ac-
cess to whole information regarding complex milieu of social interrelations. 
Spontaneous order is founded upon the notion of free individual action. 
Nevertheless the liberty of agents is limited by the so called “abstract rules 
of just conduct”. Those rules are prior to legal regulations and evolved in 
the course of the evolutionary process.  Hayek draws distinction between 
44 Coase even suggested that economy seemed to be a function of law. See MEDEMA, S.G. 
(1994). Ronald H. Coase. London: Macmillan, p. 133.
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the rules of just conduct identified with nomos and the purpose-oriented, or-
ganisational  rules  resulting  from legislative  process-  thesis.  According  to 
Hayek nomos includes rules without any detailed purpose, but the purpose 
of  nomos as a set of  „principles of just conduct” is to maintain  cosmos, i.e. 
spontaneous order. On the other hand thesis refers to the purpose oriented 
norms whose main task refers to the aims of organisation e.g. state. Accord-
ing to two basic types of norms; „natural” nomos and „artificial” thesis, there 
are two types of social order; cosmos and taxis. Cosmos refers to spontaneous 
order, typical for Great Society with its pluralistic approach to values and 
forms of social as well as individual life whereas  taxis  is the purpose-ori-
ented order of state.
The interrelationship between those two orders and respective two types 
of rules is a central issue for Hayek. He refers nomos to the rules of private 
law whereas  thesis rather to public law.45 According to Hayek  thesis  and 
nomos should not be blend but rather separate since there is real threat of 
domination of public law over private law. This assumption is however dif-
ficult  to reconcile  with contemporary structure of  legal  order,  where the 
norms  of  private  and public  law  interfere  between themselves.  Another 
problem with Hayek’s theory regards the origin and essence of rules of just 
conduct. Those rules seem to evolve in course of evolutionary process very 
similar to the history of common law.46 In reality they were always effected 
by public law, but Hayek seems to refer  nomos rather to ideal model than 
historically developed and existing in reality set of rules. For him rules of 
just conduct may be identified with three fundamental rights as stated by 
Hume: „that of stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of 
the performance of promises”.47
Hayek opposes constructivism of the type evolving from Descares’ ra-
tional philosophy. He does not recognise the link between constructivism 
and the moral basis of above stated rules of just conduct. One has to admit, 
that what for Hayek is just a kind of natural foundation of spontaneous or-
der is in reality nothing more than a special category of moral foundational-
45 HAYEK, F.A. (1973). Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New Statement of the Principles of Justice  
and Political Economy, vol. 1: Rules and Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 132.
46 Ibid, pp. 17-24.
47 HAYEK, F.A. (1976). Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New Statement of the Principles of Justice  
and Political Economy, vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
p. 40.
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ism and constructivism based on secularised version of  natural  law and 
morality as it was perceived by the Enlightenment philosophers: Hume and 
Kant.48
This is perhaps the reason for certain similarity between Hayek’s idea of 
nomos and Weinrib’s concept of private law.49 To some extend both are anti-
functionalist, even if Hayek agrees, that nomos as a whole is to some extend 
purpose- oriented. For Weinrib the purpose of law is law itself. Nonetheless 
many other concepts including total separation of private and public law 
are  similar.  Nomos is  set  up predominantly  by  courts  and judges.  Taxis 
refers rather to the politically oriented legislation.50
Another problem regards the role and ontological nature of law. Accord-
ing to Hayek’s account law seems to be both frame (nomos) of the social or-
der  and  the  instrument  of  state  (taxis).  Thus  one  may  sum  up  that  in 
Hayek’s theory law provides expectation of behaviour and at the same time 
law as a framework is based on enforcement of legal obligations and legal 
sanction protecting private property and expectations of economic agents.
One general remark may be added: both economists and lawyers trace 
back very often to Aristotle. Karl Polanyi called him the founder of econom-
ics,51 whereas Ernst Weinrib points out that Aristotle invented private law.52 
In fact the fifth book of Nicomachean Ethics on justice seems to be an interdis-
ciplinary reflection on both; economic exchange and the basis of legal rela-
tions and obligations.53 The fundamental  difference between utility-value 
and exchange-value was discovered by Aristotle.54 He referred commutative 
48 About the weaknesses of the „Enlightenment project” see; SIMMONDS, N.E. (1984). The  
Decline of Juridical Reason. Doctrine and Theory in the Legal Order. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, pp. 48, 60-64; GOLECKI, M.J. (2000). Cnota czy wspolnota polityczna (Virtue 
or Political Community. Some Remarks on Alisdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. A Study in  
Moral Theory). Kwartalnik Konserwatywny (The Conservative Quarterly) 6, p. 134.
49 WEINRIB, E.J. (1995). The Idea of Private Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
pp. 1-21.
50 The difference between taxis and nomos seems to reflect the dichotomy between policy and 
principle adopted by Ronald Dworkin, cf. DWORKIN, R. (1998). Law’s Empire. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2nd ed., pp.221-224.
51 POLANYI, K. (1968). Aristotle Discovers the Eeconomy. [in:] DALTON, G. (ed.). Primitive,  
Archaic and Modern Economies. Essays of Karl Polanyi. New York: Anchor Books, p. 81.
52 WEINRIB, E. J. (1995). The Idea of Private Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
p. 56.
53 ARISTOTLE. Nicomachean Ethics V. 1129-1133.
54 The best exponent of the thesis is SOUDEK, J. (1952). Aristotle’s Theory of Exchange: An  
Enquiry into the Origins of Economic Analysis. Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 96, p. 45.
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justice to what is now called market exchange. Accordingly, the price and 
exchange-value is usually defined by market forces. Only in case of collapse 
of voluntary exchange the judge determines the price.  He represents not 
only state but a kind of justice no longer based on commutative but rather 
on distributive justice.55 But Aristotle rejected the possibility of founding so-
cial life on market exchange. For Aristotle did not distinguish between soci-
ety and community - Greek  polis was based on interpersonal relations, on 
friendship rather than on exchange.56
As Polanyi  had pointed  out,  according to  Aristotelian tradition  there 
were  three  levels  of  social  interaction:  „gift”,  „exchange”  and  „threat”. 
„Gift” operated on a level of friendship and morality,  „exchange” on level 
of market transactions, and  „threat” on level of law and state sanctions.57 
Perhaps the most dramatic process in the history of economic thought was 
its concentration solely on market exchange. This was not the case as far as 
Adam Smith and his  Lectures on Jurisprudence or  Wealth of Nations  are con-
cerned.58 Such identification of all possible social interactions with market 
exchanges resulted with „economic imperialism”.
The crisis of jurisprudence enabled economic analysis of law to penetrate 
legal practice, legal theory, legal education. Legal theory is in crisis because 
the  contemporary  jurisprudential  theories  attacked  by  pragmatism  give 
very weak basis  for  legislation and adjudication.  Economics  seems more 
solid. But economic theory is in a state of crisis perhaps even deeper than 
jurisprudence. The model of perfect market has been revised. Various theor-
ies of market imperfections attract attention. Economics as well as jurispru-
dence requires a broadened perspective, more realistic assumptions, a rich-
er ontology. These propositions may be satisfied by an interdisciplinary ap-
55 ARISTOTLE. Nicomachean Ethics. 1132a22.
56 The theory is embodied in ARISTOTLE. Politics. I.8-10. See LEWIS, T.J. (1978). Acquisition  
and Anxiety: Aristotle’s Case Against the Market. Canadian Journal of Economics 11, p. 83; 
MEIKLE, S. (1979). Aristotle and Exchange Value. [in:] MILLER, F. and KEYT, R.D. (eds.). A 
Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. New York, pp. 163-169.
57 POLANYI, K. (1957). The Economy as Instituted Process. [in:] POLANYI, K. et al. (eds.). Trade  
and Markets in the Early Empires. Economies in History and Theory. Glencoe: Free Press, p. 250.
58 In this respect A. Smith continued Aristotelian tradition; cf. his notion of jurisprudence as a 
science on commutative and distributive justice (A. Smith (1982), Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
MEEK, R.L. et al. (eds.). Indiannapolis: Liberty Fund, pp. 5, 397-401). About the wider scope 
of Smith’s analysis, not limited to the notion of “economic man”, but embracing morality, 
sympathy and generosity – SEN, A. (1995). Rationality and Social Choice. American Economic 
Review 85, p. 15.
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proach addressing the question how law as well as economy are possible, 
how they work within social reality - the reality of complex networks, pat-
terns of exchange, systems of communication. Jurisprudence based on mor-
al foundations has been refuted - because no moral foundation, common 
value system for complex society are possible to identify. Change in legal 
theory  is  thus  necessary  because  jurisprudence  does  not  reflect  the 
paradigm shift from non democratic to democratic law making process.59 
The central institution of society is market;  it is in fact market society. It 
does not mean that morality does no longer play any important role - but 
morality,  custom or  convention are  not  characteristic  for  market  society; 
they are limited to small groups and communities. According to N. Sim-
monds, the jurisprudence of market society should be based on assumption, 
that  „property is distributed by means of innumerable individual transac-
tions between consenting parties, and which is pervaded by relationships of 
an essentially limited, contractual and often transitory nature”.60
Within  the  landscape  of  such  market  society  we  have  dichotomy 
between free exchange on the market based on protection of property and 
freedom of contract and institutions with their hierarchy, power and com-
mon purposes. What we really need is a theory on law and economics em-
bracing  both:  market  and  institutions  and  explaining  the  interrelations 
between them. Such theory would be interdisciplinary: social, legal and eco-
nomic. It would be based on assumption, that legal norms play a double 
role in society. On the one hand there are providing expectation about the 
behaviour of other agents and thus may form a kind of cognitive resources; 
on the other law as enforceable normative system protects rights and phys-
ically or conventionally enforces obligations.61
59 MORTON, P. (1998). An Institutional Theory of Law. Keeping Law in its Place. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, p. 67.
60 SIMMONDS, N.E. (1984). The Decline of Juridical Reason. Doctrine and Theory in the Legal  
Order. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 28.
61 Such approach is shared by TAMANAHA, B.Z. (1997). Realistic Socio-legal Theory.  
Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 93-128, who says about 
„two fundamental categories of the concept of law”; ibid, p. 93.
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